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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010: RULEMAKING IN THE 
SHADOW OF INCENTIVE-BASED REGULATION 
 
SAM FOSTER HALABI1 
 
I. Introduction: The Space Between Judicial Review of the Affordable Care Act and Delegated 
Authority to Administrative Agencies 
 
The federal courts are unevenly divided in their treatment of the initial constitutional challenges 
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Affordable Care Act”). Two district 
judges have ruled that the individual mandate provision of the law exceeds Congress’s constitutional 
authority and one has struck down the law in its entirety.2  Many more district judges have used the 
Twombly and Iqbal-emboldened Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to turn away similar 
challenges across the country.3  Although the question is years from final resolution, it appears that 
the 111th Congress internalized U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting its power under the 
Commerce Clause, anticipating constitutional challenges to the individual mandate to purchase 
health insurance, Medicaid expansion and insurance exchange regimes and structuring the law to 
survive those challenges.4  The majority of the district judges who are meticulously combing through 
the 2700-plus page legislation, holding hearings and carefully weighing well-funded and sophisticated 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law.  J.D. Harvard, 2005; M.Phil. Oxford, 2001; B.A. B.S. Kansas 
State University, 1999.  The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for comments. 
2 On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119.  U.S. District Judge Henry Hudson ruled that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause and could not be characterized as a tax.  Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 
3:10CV188HEH (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010).  Judge Vinson struck down the law in its entirety.  Florida v. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2010) 
3 See e.g. Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010); Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010); Kevin Sack, Judge Rules Health Care 
Law is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/health/policy/08health.html?_r=1;  See also Timothy Jost, Examining Judge 
Hudson’s Decision on the Individual Mandate, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/12/14/examining-judge-hudsons-decision-on-the-individual-mandate/ 
4 See e.g. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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arguments from multiple constituencies probably have it right.5  Whatever the novelty and reach of 
the Affordable Care Act, it requires a narrow reading of the Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent to decide – to name two possibilities – that the individual mandate does not rationally 
serve Congress’s plan for regulating access to health insurance or that tying so much of the reform 
law to Medicaid expansion constitutes the only known example of Congress impermissibly coercing 
the States with its implied spending power.6  These fights will undoubtedly return in various forms 
where other difficult constitutional questions are likely to arise. Specifically, there will be debates 
about the substantial powers Congress delegated to regulatory agencies – primarily the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services – and the deference the courts will show those agencies in light of 
applicable U.S. Supreme Court decisions.7  For example, Richard Epstein has argued that the 
Affordable Care Act’s “standardless” delegation of authority to the Secretary of HHS to set essential 
benefits packages and monitor premium increases is tantamount to transforming health insurance 
providers into public utilities.8  Between facial constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act 
and lawsuits based on defects in agency rules or the rulemaking process lies the significant 
discretionary area in which the Secretary of HHS, and others, will make the most important 
implementation decisions.  This Article is intended to provide agencies guidance for shaping the 
rules that Congress clearly intended them to adopt and implement, but which courts are less likely to 
question.  This article argues that (1) Congress demonstrated a strong intent for private enforcement 
of the Affordable Care Act’s provisions (especially those expanding Medicare and Medicaid benefits 
and eligibility); (2) Congress concurrently included enhancements for private enforcement of 
governmental payments programs in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act9 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act10; and, therefore, (3) administrative 
agencies should structure rules to facilitate private enforcement.  The argument proceeds as follows.  
Congress, determining that markets (money incentives) are smarter than people (salaried regulators), 
expanded the circumstances under which it would pay private citizens to root out and report 
improper or fraudulent activity against the taxpayers.11  Because those circumstances are likely to 
apply across a wide range of industry sectors, Congress included the enhancements in different 
legislative acts.  Administrative agencies, especially those overseeing government payments 
programs, will advance Congressional mandates for efficiency and effective enforcement by shaping 
rules with the aim of facilitating private enforcement.  Toward that end, agencies should look 
beyond the immediate charging statute for guidance.   
 
II. Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP: Overpayment, Fraud and the Affordable Care Act 
 
                                                 
5 See Brendon Farrington, White House, experts: Health care suit will fail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/23/white-house-experts-health-care-suit-will-fail/. 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
7 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
8 Richard Epstein, Impermissible Rulemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill is Unconstitutional, POINT OF LAW, 
Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/impermissible-ratemaking-in-
he.php. 
9 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
10 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
11 This division is of course somewhat simplistic.  The “revolving door” between administrative agencies and consulting, 
law and lobbying firms (to say nothing of the regulated firms themselves) located at centers of political decision-making 
means that regulators will inevitably fashion rules with the knowledge that in the near or distant future they might rely 
upon those firms for sometimes highly paid employment.  
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With respect to the Affordable Care Act, this argument is applicable to the problems of fraud 
and abuse that will inevitably accompany the expansion of health entitlements.  The most important 
health care entitlement programs are Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (“CHIP”).  Generally, Americans who are 65 years old or younger and disabled are eligible 
for Medicare. Medicare is administered by the federal government and is broken into different parts.  
Medicare Part A covers hospital insurance.12 Medicare Part B provides insurance against the costs of 
certain outpatient services administered by a physician during an office visit as well as “durable 
medical equipment” like walkers and wheelchairs.13 Medicare Part C (or Medicare Advantage) allows 
private insurers to provide care at the same level as Medicare, but allows certain flexibilities in 
coverage and provider choice that may lower costs for recipients.14 Medicare Part D subsidizes the 
cost of prescription drugs but does so through private plans that do not offer systematically 
standardized coverage.15 Medicaid is the joint federal-state program that is aimed at providing health 
care to low-income individuals and families.  Medicaid is funded jointly by the federal and state 
governments, but states administer the program and determine guidelines for eligibility and service 
provision.16  CHIP is aimed at providing health insurance coverage for children in families with 
modest incomes that are nevertheless too high for Medicaid eligibility.  Its administrative structure 
closely resembles Medicaid’s.17 
 
The Affordable Care Act expands eligibility for Medicaid to those making 133% of the federal 
poverty line and requires States to add childless adults to the eligible population.18  Previously, a 
recipient could not qualify only by virtue of low income.  Medicaid only helped those who were at or 
below the poverty line and had met another requirement – typically pregnancy, disability, age or 
having minor dependents.19  The Affordable Care Act will increase those eligible for Medicaid from 
60 million to somewhere between 75 million and 78 million.20  The law also adds certain benefits to 
Medicare and CHIP eligible individuals and families.21  
                                                 
12 Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-
benefits/part-a.aspx. 
13 Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-
b.aspx. 
14 Medicare Advantage (Part C), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx. 
15 What is Part D (Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-
basics/medicare-benefits/part-d.aspx. 
16 See Overview Medicaid Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/. 
17 See Overview of National CHIP Policy, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/. 
18 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001 (a) (1). The law adds an 8th categorical eligibility: those who are under 65 years of age, 
not pregnant, not entitled to or enrolled for Medicaid benefits under another category. The law 
establishes eligibility at 133% of federal poverty level, but allows for an additional 5% modified adjusted gross income. 
19 See id. 
20 With respect to the number of new Medicaid enrollees, the numbers vary with source.  The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the expansion would increase the number of enrollees in Medicaid and the Children's Health 
Insurance Program by about 15 million, costing states about $26 billion over 10 years. The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services estimated that the law would add 18 million people on the Medicaid beneficiary list. An additional 2 
million with employer-sponsored health insurance would enroll in Medicaid for supplemental coverage. The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, a group that analyzes health care policy, estimated that Medicaid would enroll as many as 17.1 
million new beneficiaries under the health care bill. 
21 See e.g. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare and the New Health Care Law – What it Means for You (May 
2010), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11467.pdf. 
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All stakeholders fear that the increased entitlements will cause negligent and fraudulent 
overpayments under the programs to increase.  In 2008, the FBI arrested doctors and patients who 
submitted over 140,000 false claims for pretending to receive expensive HIV- drug treatments.22  On 
October 13, 2010, federal and state law enforcement officials indicted 44 individuals for billing 
Medicare for over $100 million for “services” that were never provided at phantom clinics.23  One 
pharmacist bilked Medicaid for over $1.8 million in less than a year by submitting phony claims for 
prescriptions that he never filled.24  Yet not all of the improprieties are so sensational.  Because 
Medicaid and Medicare “pay and chase” – that is, reimburse claims as a matter of course and then 
pursue improper billing later – millions of dollars are also lost for services, drugs, or supplies that are 
unnecessary, not performed or are of a lower quality or more costly than those that are actually 
performed.25  “Major corporations such as pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers and 
institutions such as hospitals and nursing facilities have also committed fraud, sometimes on a grand 
scale.” 26  Physicians may refer patients to providers with whom they share a financial interest and 
create incentives to raise costs or pay kick-backs, but Congress has curtailed such practices with the 
so-called Stark Law.27  In addition, providers benefit from what appear to be even benign mistakes.  
For example, charging a patient for an “office visit” when he or she only visited for a flu shot, is a 
tactic known as “upcoding” that results in a higher reimbursement for the health care provider.28 
Sensing that the known difficulties of monitoring reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid 
might present opponents with arguments against expansion of entitlements, Congress included 
measures to more effectively screen applicants for Medicare and Medicaid participation, encourage 
information sharing across law enforcement agencies and toughen penalties and the means by which 
they are collected. 
 
III. The Regulatory Structure of Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP 
 
Medicare and Medicaid providers are regulated generally by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) and specifically by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) which oversee enrollment, reimbursement, monitoring and enforcement policies applicable 
to health care providers under Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP.29  Both the HHS Office of the 
Inspector General and CMS also maintain integrity units that investigate reimbursement patterns 
and individual claims to detect billing errors and unusual medical treatment.  Under the Medicaid 
                                                 
22 Carrie Johnson, Medical Fraud a Growing Problem, WASH. POST (June 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061203915_2.html. 
23 Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges 44 Members and Associates of an Armenian-
American Organized Crime Enterprise with $100 Million Medicare Fraud (Oct. 13, 2010), available at 
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo101310.htm. 
24 Melissa Grace, Pharmacist Patrick Alcindor Stole $18 million from Taxpayers in Medicaid Fraud Scheme, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/11/04/2010-11-
04_pharmacist_patrick_alcindor_stole_18m_from_taxpayers_in_medicaid_fraud_scheme_la.html. 
25 See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 58238 (proposed 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
26 Testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, Mar. 4, 2010, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2010/3-4-10LevinsonHAppropsSub.pdf. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. §§411.350-411.389. 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE 
CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, at 12, available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/clm104c18.pdf. 
29 Law enforcement agencies at the federal and state level also work with the HHS OIG and CMS. 
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program, states also maintain fraud control units to monitor payments to providers.30  Yet CMS 
concedes that the job is overwhelming.31  In 2008, CMS reviewed less than 5% of Medicare claims.32  
State Medicaid reviewers are similarly inundated.33 
 
CMS adopts some form of command-and-control, performance standard and incentive-based 
regulation as part of administering Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP.34  These categories provide a 
useful taxonomy by which to understand theories of regulation even if in practice the line between 
them blurs and some forms of regulation might fall outside of these neat descriptions. 
Loosely defined, command-and-control rules impose specific requirements on regulated firms. For 
instance, a polluter might be required to adopt a particular type of technology designed to limit the 
quantity of pollution. Performance-based standards tell firms what they must accomplish but leave 
them to decide how best to do so. Such a standard, for example, might specify the maximum 
quantity of pollution that a firm may produce without specifying the means by which the firm is 
required to comply. Finally, incentive-based systems force firms to internalize the total costs of their 
activities, leaving firms to decide what, if anything, to do about those costs.35 CMS, for example, 
now requires a provider to have a compliance and ethics program in place “that is effective in 
preventing and detecting criminal, civil, and administrative violations and in promoting quality care . 
. . .”36  Performance standards are imposed to varying degrees on providers of specific services in 
order to qualify for participation in Medicare and Medicaid.37  For example, a state may require that 
providers of certain services or durable medical equipment meet established financial or health 
outcome criteria in order to continue participating in the Medicaid program.38  Incentive-based 
regulation in these programs takes two primary forms: the False Claims Act and Recovery Audit 
Contractors. 
 
IV. Incentive-based Regulation in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs 
 
A. The False Claims Act 
 
                                                 
30 U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNITS 
(MFCU). available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/mfcu. 
31 Johnson, supra note 23. 
32 Id. 
33 See e.g. John Lyon, Lawmakers review Medicaid audit, ARKANSAS NEWS, April 9, 2010, available at 
http://arkansasnews.com/2010/04/09/lawmakers-review-medicaid-audit/; Tyley Whitley, Va. Medicaid paid out $39 
million improperly in fiscal 2009, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2010, available at 
http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2010/oct/13/medi13-ar-559304/.  
34 Kimberly Brandt, Director, Program Integrity Group, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, Testimony before 
Committee on Ways and Means on Reducing Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Medicare (June 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2010/06/t20100615a.html. 
35 See Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1163, 1173-74 (1998). 
36 Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 58238 (proposed 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
37 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROVIDER 
ENROLLMENT REGULATION, available at 
https://www.cms.gov/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/09_ProviderEnrollmentRegulation.asp. 
38 James W. Fossett et. al., Managing Medicaid Managed Care: Are States Becoming Prudent Purchasers?, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 36 
(2000). 
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Incentive-based regulation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs is both old and new.  Claims 
submitted to either program are subject to private litigation under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).39  
Enacted during the Civil War to combat fraud on the Union army, the FCA is the United States’ 
primary tool for fighting fraud directed against the public coffers.40   Under the False Claims Act 
regime, private citizens (“whistleblowers” or “relators”) work closely with the U.S. Department of 
Justice to identify inappropriate claims submitted to the government for payment.41  In 1986, 
Congress strengthened its qui tam provisions to allow whistleblowers to file suit under seal on behalf 
of the United States and share up to 30 percent of the United States’ ultimate recovery.42   While the 
qui tam complaint is under seal, and before it is served on the defendant, the United States 
Department of Justice investigates to decide whether to intervene and take over the prosecution of 
the action or decline to intervene and allow the whistleblower to proceed.43  The United States is the 
real party in interest, even in cases where it declines.44  The FCA establishes liability for any person 
who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval.45  “Knowledge” is defined broadly to include actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance of the 
truth, or reckless disregard of the truth.  A corporation is deemed to have knowledge if its employee 
acted knowingly.46  Whistleblower suits initiated under the FCA between 1987 and 2008 have 
resulted in the return of approximately $22 billion in improper payments and damages.47 
 
1. The Affordable Care Act Encourages the Use of the FCA to Combat Fraud 
 
The Affordable Care Act explicitly expanded access to private litigants suing under the FCA.  
First, Congress directly linked the retention of overpayments to false claim liability. Under the 
Affordable Care Act, “overpayments” are defined as “any [Medicare or Medicaid] funds that a 
person receives or retains . . . to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.”48  
Health care providers, suppliers, Medicaid managed care organizations, Medicare Advantage 
organizations and drug plan sponsors must “report and return” any overpayments within 60 days 
after either the date on which the overpayment was identified or the date any corresponding cost 
report was due, whichever is later.49 In addition, members of the health care industry must submit 
notification in writing to the entity to which the overpayment was returned as to the reason of the 
overpayment.50      
                                                 
39 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (2010). 
40 See United States ex tel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943). 
41 Id. 
42 False Claims Act Amendments Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153.  The U.S., in turn, is awarded treble damages and 
can impose civil fines between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim.  The phrase “qui tam” is an abbreviated form of qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, is translated by Blackstone as “who prosecutes this action for the king, etc. 
as for himself.”  In the English common law, the writ was historically available to citizens to enforce the king’s laws.  4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1154 (1765). 
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17. 
44 See id.  
45 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990); cf. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 
U.S. 349 (1929).   
47 JACK A. MEYER, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FIGHTING MEDICARE FRAUD: MORE BANG FOR 
THE FEDERAL BUCK (July 2006), available at http://www.taf.org/FCA-2006report.pdf. 
48 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
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Second, Congress used the Affordable Care Act to expand access to whistleblowers who identify 
fraudulent practices by allowing them to use publicly disclosed information. Previously, such 
information was unavailable to them due to limiting court decisions that fashioned a “Public 
Disclosure Bar” to claims that relied in significant part on publicly available information.51 Section 
10104(j)(2) of the law replaces the prior version § 3730(e)(4) of the FCA with new language that 
expands the scope of the original source exception and shifts the Public Disclosure Bar from a 
jurisdictional prohibition to a more flexible standard, with discretionary power held by the 
government.52  One important effect of the change is to enable whistleblowers to use information 
available from a state Medicaid hearing or process in order to establish a claim under the FCA.53  
These FCA amendments are not limited to qui tam cases involving federal health care programs.54 
2. Congress Concurrently Enacted FCA Enhancements in the Fraud Enforcement 
Recovery Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
In the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), Congress included 
enhancements to the FCA.  Most significantly for purposes of Medicare and Medicaid, Congress 
expanded the number of actors upon whom fraud would support a “claim” under the FCA; 
included the retention of government overpayments as a basis for FCA liability; broadened the 
scope of conspiracy under the FCA; enhanced protections for whistleblowers against retaliation; 
and, bolstered the government’s investigative powers.55  For example, under judicial interpretations 
of the FCA prior to FERA, a skilled nursing facility might contract out certain physical therapy 
treatments.56  Because the physical therapy provider did not directly submit claims to Medicare or 
                                                 
51 See Graham County Soil v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010). The amendments legislatively overruled Graham County 
Soil v. U.S. in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the public disclosure bar was intended to limit whistle-
blowers' ability to use secondhand information to generate false claims cases. 
52 Under § 10104(j)(2) of the Affordable Care Act, the government now has the ability to control whether a qui tam 
complaint is dismissed based on publicly disclosed information.  Section 10104(j)(2) provides: 
Section (4)(A).  The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed: (i) in a Federal 
criminal, civil or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party;(ii) in a Congressional, 
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, 
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the 
information. 
The Affordable Care Act also narrows the definition of publicly disclosed information and expands the scope of the 
original source exception.  The new language also widens the definition of an “original source” by eliminating the 
requirement that a whistleblower have "direct" knowledge of facts underlying his or her allegations.  A qui tam 
whistleblower need only have "knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations 
. . . ."  Under the new law, a whistleblower's allegations can now be based on indirect information, provided those 
allegations add to information that is already contained in the public domain.  The public disclosure must also result 
from a federal report, hearing, audit or investigation.  Public disclosures in state or local government reports also no 
longer bar the whistleblower’s claim. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.  FERA rolled back judicial 
decisions that had limited the FCA’s reach, including Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 
(2008); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032 (2005); 
and United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev'd, 562 F.3d 295 (4th 
Cir. 2009).   
56 David S. Barmak, Providers/suppliers beware: expansion of the False Claims Act, LEXOLOGY, Nov. 1, 2010, available 
at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=32d3b9a3-1ce9-4cd8-9f22-27ee7c847328. 
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Medicaid, an FCA claim could not prevail against the therapist.57  The amendments to the law 
corrected this defect. 
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“financial reform law”), 
Congress created a uniform three-year statute of limitations period for claims of retaliation by 
whistleblowers and widened FERA’s definition of acts protected by the retaliation cause of action.58   
These measures demonstrate an identifiable intent from Congress to use “private attorneys general” 
in the expanding areas in which government payments are made and might be fraudulently obtained. 
 
B. Recovery Audit Contractors 
 
In 2003, Congress required Medicare (not Medicaid) to enact a pilot program whereby private 
auditing entities – recovery audit contractors (“RACs”) – would be given incentive to hunt down 
overpayments or improper billing submissions by health care providers.59  RACs typically review a 
sample of a health care provider’s claims for a given period and determine an error rate.  RACs then 
generalize the error rate over the universe of claims during the audit period to calculate an alleged 
overpayment amount.60 The amount sought to be recouped by CMS based on the extrapolation 
from a relatively small sample of claims billed can be large. The RACs are paid a contingency fee 
based on the overpayment amount, which may provide their auditors with an incentive to find 
claims that they contend should have been denied.  Between 2005 and 2007, the private auditors 
returned $693.6 million to the Medicare Trust Funds.61  The Affordable Care Act expanded RAC 
contracting to all Medicare programs and required States to contract with RACs for Medicaid 
audits.62  As with FERA and the financial reform law, the expansion of the RAC program shows a 
clear mandate from Congress to mobilize incentive-based regulation of healthcare providers that 
submit claims for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. 
 
V. Rulemaking in the Shadow of Incentive Based Regulation 
 
A. CMS Cannot Effectively Monitor Fraud and Waste with Current or Promised Resources 
 
Prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the General Accounting Office issued regular 
reports which indicated that CMS could not keep pace with enforcement demands.  On June 28, 
2005, the GAO reported that CMS had only 8 employees devoted to chasing down improper 
Medicaid billing.63  On March 3, 2010, the GAO reported that between 2005 and 2008, CMS had 
failed to ensure that Medicare Part D drug plan providers had implemented policies to prevent and 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 See 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). 
59 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, REVIEW AUDIT 
CONTRACTOR OVERVIEW, available at  https://www.cms.gov/RAC/. 
60 Deborah J. Juneau, Recovery Audit Contractor Program Will Be Expanded to Medicaid, LOUISIANA LAW BLOG, Sept. 2, 2010, 
http://www.louisianalawblog.com/health-law-recovery-audit-contractor-program-will-be-expanded-to-medicaid.html. 
61 Press Release, Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, New Report Shows 
CMS Pilot Program Saving Nearly $700 Million in Improper Medicare Payments (July 11, 2008), available at 
http://mailcenter.newmediagateway.com/healthport/files/flash_docs/public/0/RAC_press_release.pdf. 
62 Id. 
63 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE: CMS’S COMMITMENT TO HELPING STATES 
SAFEGUARD PROGRAM DOLLARS IS LIMITED (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05855t.pdf. 
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catch fraud and waste.64  The same month, GAO reported that even where RACs had identified 
weaknesses in provider billing processes, CMS failed to act on its recommendations.65  The GAO 
reports focus generally on the universe of command-and-control and performance standards 
regulations that are in place but have not been implemented because the HHS OIG or CMS are 
unable – by virtue of resource scarcity – to coordinate or enforce.  
 
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, Congress increased the budget for HHS’s 
oversight activities by approximately $35 million per year for ten years and mandated the 
development of better screening and data-sharing processes.66  Yet these enhancements will not 
realize their intended effect if enforcement activity is centered in the regulatory agency instead of 
using whistleblowers and RACs to facilitate actions by regulators and prosecutors.  Fraud and waste 
are the natural effect of rent-seeking market actors who are exploiting a system whose resource 
constraints limit its policing ability.  The historical lesson is that similarly motivated market actors 
are most effectively positioned to root out fraudulent or inaccurate billing practices. 
 
B. HHS and CMS Should Shape Rules to Facilitate Incentive-Based Regulatory Mechanisms 
 
When developing and implementing regulations, administrative agencies should explicitly 
consider Congress’s efforts to force health care providers to internalize the costs related to 
overbilling and mistakes, even if that authority lies outside an immediate charging statute.  This 
consideration includes but is not limited to (1) interpreting statutes in order to maximize the 
opportunity for private enforcement and (2) coordinating instructional materials and billing practices 
in order to avoid conflicts with private litigants (or the Department of Justice with whom 
whistleblowers coordinate). 
1. Drafting Rules from the Perspective of Private Enforcement 
Potential whistleblowers and RACs are likely to (1) know the exact wording of statutes and 
regulations well and (2) give the text of statutes and regulations a strict reading in order to increase 
the incidence of overbilling and the size of their awards.  Rule-making in the shadow of incentive-
based regulation counsels HHS and CMS to take measures that give effect to the clear intent of 
Congress (both inside and outside the Affordable Care Act) to promote these strict readings. 
Consider the example of the Affordable Care Act’s provisions prohibiting health care providers 
from retaining overpayments.  The law states that any overpayment retained after the deadline 
becomes an “obligation” for purposes of the FCA.67  Therefore, a failure to return any Medicare or 
Medicaid overpayments by the deadline may result in FCA liability. In order to avoid such liability, 
CMS will inevitably require health care providers and other entities receiving reimbursement under 
                                                 
64 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE PART D: CMS OVERSIGHT OF PART D SPONSORS' FRAUD AND ABUSE 
PROGRAMS HAS BEEN LIMITED, BUT CMS PLANS OVERSIGHT EXPANSION (2010), available at  
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-481T. 
65 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE AUDIT CONTRACTING: WEAKNESSES REMAIN IN ADDRESSING 
VULNERABILITIES TO IMPROPER PAYMENTS , ALTHOUGH IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO CONTRACT OVERSIGHT (2010), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10143.pdf. 
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, HHS Secretary Sebelius, U.S. Attorney General Holder Kick-
Off First Regional Health Care Fraud Prevention Summit in Miami, Florida (July 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100716a.html.s 
67 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
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Medicare or Medicaid to implement policies and procedures on reporting and returning 
overpayments that are consistent with the requirements in the Affordable Care Act.  CMS will also 
have to adopt regulations that govern those policies. 
The statutory language itself does not give guidance as to when an overpayment is “identified” 
and the position likely to be taken by providers’ counsel is that overpayment has not been 
“identified” until the provider has “(1) absolutely concluded that there is an overpayment and 
(2) ascertained the amount of the overpayment.”68  The narrower reading likely to be given by 
whistleblowers is that an overpayment has been “identified” where there is much less than an 
“absolute conclusion” and well before an exact amount has been precisely calculated.  The narrower 
reading is more consistent with Congress’s actions in concurrent legislation expanding 
whistleblowers’ access to the courts under the FCA.  
 
a. Early Signs that CMS will not Rely on Incentive-Based Regulation: The Self-
Reporting Disclosure Protocol under the Stark Law 
 
Early guidance, protocols and rules proposed by HHS and CMS instead seem to hint at a 
centrifugal perspective whereby HHS and CMS reserve for themselves the greatest amount of 
discretion in the greatest number of cases.  There are some early indications that CMS is opting for 
rules that will add to its already significant burden instead of harnessing the incentives provided for 
private litigants. 
 
Take the example of the self-referral disclosure protocol that was required for the Stark Law.  
This protocol governs the types of arrangements physicians can maintain with health care providers 
in which they have a financial interest.69  Section 6409 of the Affordable Care Act requires the 
Secretary of HHS, in cooperation with the HHS Office of the Inspector General to establish a 
Medicare self-referral disclosure protocol (“SRDP”) for providers of services and suppliers to self-
disclose actual or potential violations of the Stark Law.70  Section 6409 requires the Secretary of 
HHS to inform providers of services and suppliers of how to disclose an actual or potential violation 
pursuant to the protocol through publication on the CMS website.71  Section 6409 also mandates 
that the SRDP must include direction to health care providers of services and suppliers on the 
specific person, official, or office to whom such disclosures shall be made and instruction on the 
implication of the SRDP on corporate integrity agreements and corporate compliance agreements.72 
Section 6409(b) grants the Secretary of HHS the authority to reduce the amounts due for all 
violations of the Stark Law.73  In establishing the amount by which an overpayment resulting from 
an actual or potential violation(s) may be reduced, the Secretary may consider: the nature and extent 
of the improper or illegal practice; the timeliness of such disclosure; the cooperation in providing 
additional information related to the disclosure; and such other factors as the Secretary considers 
                                                 
68 Barbara Vandegrift, Warning: Report and Return Overpayments in 60 Days or Risk False Claims Act, HEALTHCARE FINANCE 
NEWS, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/warning-report-and-return-
overpayments-60-days-or-risk-false-claims-act. 
69 See 42 U.S.C. §1393nn. 




73 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, 
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf. 
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appropriate.74Pursuant to the statute, the CMS-proposed SDRP allows providers to send an email 
disclosing an actual or potential violation which would suspend the 60 day period otherwise given to 
the provider to return overpayments.75  CMS will subsequently investigate the disclosure.  While the 
protocol requires providers to report in “good faith,” the upshot is to permit providers to escape 
private enforcement against overpayments by turning to overstretched regulators to determine (1) 
whether they, in fact, reported in good faith and (2) to assess for themselves the culpability of the 
provider.76  While the Affordable Care Act grants the Secretary of HHS the authority to reduce the 
amounts owed under the Stark Law, there is no requirement that she do so and the force of 
Congressional enactments in FERA and the financial reform law counsels that she reduce 
overpayments only in limited circumstances.  If the regulations are formed in that way, private actors 
will discover improper payments more readily and providers will act under a greater incentive to 
ensure that their contracts with physicians are lawful. 
 
b. Suspending Overpayments for Credible Allegations of Fraud 
 
Similarly, in its proposed rule implementing the Affordable Care Act’s provisions which suspend 
payments under Medicare and Medicaid for credible allegations of fraud, CMS proposes that it 
review “all allegations, facts, and information carefully and act judiciously on a case-by-case basis 
when contemplating a payment suspension, mindful of the impact that payment suspension may 
have upon a provider.”77  CMS further proposes to provide four exceptions for suspension.78 These 
exceptions would include an exception for “a determination by CMS that a payment suspension is 
not in the best interests of the Medicare program.”79  The net effect of these proposals appears to be 
further centralization of both rulemaking and enforcement in the hands of CMS.  As it concedes and 
the GAO confirms, the CMS is overburdened with existing command-and-control and performance 
standards-based regulatory structures. 
 
2.  Coordinating Existing Manuals and Payments Practices to Facilitate Incentive-Based 
Regulation 
 
Furthermore, CMS should review its existing manuals, guidance and protocols to ensure that 
they are consistent with RAC bill auditing practices and that they do not hinder FCA claims.  As 
with shaping rules from the perspective of private litigants, incentive-based regulation is facilitated 
by clearly defining payment practices and ensuring that processors comply with stated policies.  
Inconsistencies between regulations and payment manuals have frequently led courts to require 
reimbursements regarded as improper by CMS.80  Recovery Audit Contractors’ efforts to recoup 
overpayments have been thwarted where Medicare Appeals Councils find that CMS manuals 
                                                 
74 The provider cannot simultaneously request an advisory opinion from HHS.  
https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/95_advisory_opinions.asp#TopOfPage. 
75 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL, 
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 75 Fed. Reg. 184 p. 58222. 
78 Id. at 58223. 
79 Id..  In the case of a State agency determination for Medicaid, the exception would be a State agency’s determination 
that it was not in the interest of the Medicaid program. 
80 See e.g. Maximum Home Health Care Inv. v. Shalala, 272 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2001); National Medical Enterprises v. 
Bowen, 851 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
CONSULTATIONS IN MEDICARE: CODING AND REIMBURSEMENT, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-02-
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contained inconsistent language as to the validity of a claim.81   Conversely, private litigants, and, for 
that matter, the Department of Justice, are thwarted where payments appear to be improper under 
regulations or payment manuals, but CMS informally deems the payment valid and pays as a matter 
of course.82   
VI. Conclusion 
 
This Article might be misconstrued as a targeted criticism of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, but that is not its aim.  CMS administers a massive health insurance scheme more 
efficiently than its private-sector counterparts.83   Moreover, implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act will require coordinated activity of agencies housed within the Department of Labor, the 
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture and others for which this argument is 
equally applicable.  Agencies administering statutory schemes that involve government payments 
should be attuned to Congress’s clear intent to mobilize private citizens who have information 
showing that the taxpayers are being duped or overcharged.  While whistleblower law firms and the 
Department of Justice are able to participate in the comments-on-rulemaking process, ultimate 
action will be left in the hands of the agencies.  Indeed, it is unlikely under any of the prevailing 
standards of review that their failure to consider relevant Congressional intent located in non-
charging statutes would be subject to a court’s scrutiny.  Instead, rulemaking that facilitates private 
enforcement is justified ethically by the idea that Congress is the more democratic source of 
authority and practically by the fact that private litigants may ease agencies’ already significant 
burden. 
                                                 
81 Order of Medicare Appeals Council in the case of O’Connor Hospital, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/dab/divisions/medicareoperations/macdecisions/oconnorhospital.pdf. 
82 Shoes for Amputees? Medicare waste revealed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 23, 2008), available at 
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